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Airport Authority: The California
Approach to Inverse Condemnation
and Nuisance
INTRODUCTION
Damage caused by airport noise has been the subject of extensive
litigation. The judicial trend in these cases reflects an expansion of
the theories available to adjacent homeowners.' In Baker v. Burbank-
Glendale-Pasadena Airport Authority,' the Supreme Court of Califor-
nia reinforced this trend by expanding two legal theories commonly
used to obtain relief for airport noise: inverse condemnation and
nuisance. The court held that an inverse condemnation action may
be maintained against a public entity even though the entity does not
have the power of eminent domain. 3 The court further held that a plain-
tiff may elect to treat airport noise as a "continuous" nuisance rather
than a "permanent" nuisance, thereby avoiding invalidation of the
plaintiff's claim by the statute of limitations.4 Part I of this Note sets
forth the facts and decision of the Baker case. Part II discusses the
legal background of both inverse condemnation and nuisance actions.
Part III reviews the legal ramifications of the dual holding of Baker.
I. THE CASE
A. The Facts
In 1978, the defendant, Burbank-Glendale-Pasadena Airport
Authority, became a public entity pursuant to statute when the three
cities purchased the Hollywood-Burbank Airport.' Under this statute,
the Airport Authority was denied eminent domain powers.6 In 1982,
1. Bennet, Airport Noise Litigation: Case Law Review, J. Am L. & CoM. 449, 474 (1982).
2. 39 Cal. 3d 862, 705 P.2d 866, 218 Cal. Rptr. 293 (1985).
3. Id. at 868, 218 Cal. Rptr. at 296.
4. Id. at 873, 218 Cal. Rptr. at 300.
5. CAL. Gov'T CODE §6546.1 (statute specifically authorizing the acquisition and opera-
tion of the Hollywood-Burbank Airport as a public airport). See also id. §§6500-6519 (authoriz-
ing joint powers agreements for the purchase of public agencies).
6. Id. §6546.1. This section provides in part that the defendant "shall not authorize or
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ten homeowners who lived adjacent to the airport filed suit raising
inverse condemnation and nuisance claims. The plaintiffs sought
recovery for damages caused by noise, smoke, and vibrations from
flights over their homes.
The trial court sustained a demurrer to the inverse condemnation
claim on the ground that an inverse condemnation action can be filed
only against public entities having eminent domain powers.7 A demurrer
to the nuisance claim was also sustained on the basis that the claim
was barred by the statute of limitations.8 The court held that airport
noise constituted a permanent nuisance upon which the one-year statute
of limitations9 had run in 1979.0 The trial court stated that the legal
test for determining whether a nuisance is permanent or continuing
is whether the nuisance was subject to judicial, rather than volun-
tary, abatement." The appellate court upheld the demurrer to the
inverse condemnation action, but reversed the trial court on the
nuisance cause of action.'" The appellate court ruled that the plain-
tiff may elect to treat the nuisance as continuous to resolve statute
of limitation problems. 3
B. The Opinion
The holding of the California Supreme Court focused on two issues.
The court first discussed whether a public entity lacking eminent
domain power may nonetheless be held liable for inverse condemna-
tion. Secondly, the court considered whether airport operations not
subject to judicial abatement could be characterized as a continuing
nuisance, thereby allowing successive lawsuits. The court answered
both questions in the affirmative.
permit . . . the purchase of fee title to condemned real property zoned for residential use
..... I d.
7. See Baker v. Burbank-Glendale-Pasadena Airport, 197 Cal. Rptr. 357, 360 (depublished
appellate court decision).
8. Id.
9. CAL. GOV'T CODE §911.2, CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§338(2), 340. Claims against public
entities alleging injuries to persons or property must be brought by the one hundredth day
after the accrual of the cause of action. All other claims must be brought within one year
of the accrual of the cause of action. Id. The plaintiffs in Baker had alleged the defendant
became a nuisance as of the date the airport became a public entity in 1978. Baker, 39 Cal.
3d at 868, 705 P.2d at 869, 218 Cal. Rptr. at 296.
10. Baker, 197 Cal. Rptr. at 360 (depublished appellate court decision).
11. Id. at 360.
12. Id. at 371.
13. Id. at 370.
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1. Inverse Condemnation
The court first examined the inverse condemnation claim. The defen-
dant argued that inverse condemnation was a form of eminent do-
main initiated by the landowner rather than the government.' 4
Therefore, a public entity lacking the power to condemn by eminent
domain could not be liable for inverse condemnation. 5 The court
unanimously rejected this argument, and held that an inverse con-
demnation action is grounded, not on statutory eminent domain power,
but on proscriptions against a taking set forth in both the California
and United States Constitutions.' 6 The supreme court reasoned that
a homeowner can still suffer a taking despite a defendant's lack of
statutory authority to take.'
7
2. Nuisance
The court next considered whether the nuisance action was barred
by the statute of limitations." The answer depended on whether the
activities of the defendant were classified as a permanent or continuous
nuisance. Permanent nuisances are generally nuisances which by one
act result in a permanent injury, and therefore require that damages
for past, present, and future harm be assessed at one time. 9 Con-
tinuous nuisances, on the other hand, are nuisances which may be
discontinued at any time, and the persons harmed may bring suc-
cessive actions for past damages until the nuisance is abated.2"
Classification of the airport in Baker as a permanent nuisance would
invoke the one-year statute of limitatons and bar the plaintiff's action. 2'
a. Majority Opinion
The majority articulated that the test for classifying a nuisance as
either permanent or continuous should focus on the type of harm
suffered by the plaintiff, and not on the interest of the offending
14. Baker, 39 Cal. 3d at 866, 705 P.2d at 868, 218 Cal. Rptr. at 295.
15. Id.
16. CAL. CoNsT. art I, §19 provides in part: "Private property may be taken or damaged
for public use only when just compensation . . . has first been paid to . . . the owner."
U.S. CoNsT. amend. V states in part: "... nor shall private property be taken for public
use, without just compensation . . .
17. Baker, 39 Cal. 3d at 867, 705 P.2d at 868, 218 Cal. Rptr. at 295.
18. Id. at 868, 705 P.2d at 869, 218 Cal. Rptr. at 296.
19. Williams v. So. Pacific R.R. Co., 150 Cal. 624, 626, 89 P. 599, 599 (1907).
20. Phillips v. City of Pasadena, 27 Cal. 2d 104, 107-08, 162 P.2d 625, 626 (1945).
21. Baker, 39 Cal. 3d at 868, 705 P.2d at 869, 218 Cal. Rptr. at 296. See supra note 9.
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party in continuing the nuisance.22 The court held that since airport
noise involves the ongoing use of offending structures, and can be
physically abated, the nuisance is continuous in nature. 23 Therefore,
the plaintiff could bring successive suits for damages.24
The court relied on Spaulding v. Cameron21 to support this holding.
In Spaulding, the California Supreme Court held that in doubtful
cases the plaintiff may elect to treat a particular nuisance as either
permanent or continuous.26 One justification expressed by the
Spaulding court for allowing the plaintiff an election was injustice
created by statute of limitation problems.27 The Baker court applied
the election doctrine, and held that the plaintiff could elect to treat
airport noise as a continuous nuisance to avoid the statute of limita-
tions.28
The defendant argued that the election doctrine set forth in
Spaulding should not apply in the present case because the Spaulding
court had held that "privileged ' 29 activity must be deemed a perma-
nent nuisance.30 Using operations of a public utility as an example
of a clear permanent nuisance, the Spaulding court indicated that only
one action for damages caused by a permanent nuisance should be
22. Baker, 39 Cal. 3d at 868, 705 P.2d at 869, 218 Cal. Rptr. at 296.
23. The court indicated that the classification of permanent nuisance was reserved for more
solid structures, such as buildings or railroads encroaching on a person's land. Baker, 39 Cal.
3d at 869-70, 705 P.2d at 870, 218 Cal. Rptr. at 297.
24. Id. at 868-73, 705 P.2d at 869-73, 218 Cal. Rptr. at 296-300.
25. 38 Cal. 2d 265, 239 P.2d 625 (1952).
26. Id. at 268, 239 P.2d at 629.
27. Id. The court stated that if the initial injury is slight and plaintiff delays suit until
he has suffered substantial damage and thereafter the court determines the nuisance was per-
manent, the defendant may be able to bar the action by asserting the statute of limitations
ran from the time of the initial injury. Id.
28. Id. at 873, 705 P.2d at 873, 218 Cal. Rptr. at 300.
29. Apparently, the majority defined privilege in this context to mean those cases in which
the defendant is allowed to continue the nuisance. The defendant's activity is therefore
"privileged." See infra notes 32-35 and accompanying text. However, the majority concluded
that the plaintiff may still have a right to elect even if the defendant is privileged to continue
operations. See infra notes 47-48 and accompanying text. The majority then indicated that the
doctrine of election will not apply only in cases when the defendant is absolutely privileged
to continue operations. An absolutely privileged activity is apparently one in which no further
remedies remain available to the plaintiff, either because compensation has been paid or federal
law preempts the area. See infra notes 36-41 and accompanying text. The dissent viewed the
definition of "privilege" in a different context. The dissent held "privilege" to mean that the
defendant's activity is not reasonably abateable. According to the dissent, activities that are
not reasonably abateable must be deemed permanent. See infra notes 52-57 and accompanying
text. Thus, while the majority concluded that certain operations which are privileged to con-
tinue are still subject to the doctrine of election, the dissent believed that a "privilege" to
continue includes a "privilege" against the use of the doctrine of election.
30. Baker, 39 Cal. 3d at 870-71, 705 P.2d at 871-72, 218 Cal. Rptr. at 298-99.
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allowed since the utility was entitled, through compensation, to con-
tinue operations indefinitely.3'
The California Supreme Court relied on four factors to reject the
defendant's argument that Spaulding had categorized privileged
activities as permanent nuisances, thereby barring the plaintiff's right
to elect. First, the court noted that the language in Spaulding relied
on by the defendant was only dictum since Spaulding did not raise
a question of privileged activity.3" Second, the election discussion in
Spaulding was based in part on Phillips v. City of Pasadena.33 In
Phillips, the court had refused to hold that a gate erected by the
government which obstructed a road was, as a matter of law, a per-
manent nuisance. The Phillips court reasoned that although the govern-
ment was privileged to erect the gate, the gate could still be removed
at any time.34 The Baker majority interpreted both Spaulding and
Phillips to give the plaintiff a right to an election whenever the ability
to physically abate the nuisance exists, regardless of whether the
nuisance is subject to judicial abatement.35
A third factor articulated by the court in rejecting the defendant's
argument was that the privilege discussed in Spaulding was absolute.36
The majority reasoned that extensive regulation of airports under
federal law37 does not require airport operations to be absolutely
privileged.38 State law damage remedies remain available against an
airport proprietor despite the fact that federal law prohibits interference
31. Spaulding, 38 Cal. 2d at 267, 239 P.2d at 627-28. The court stated: "The clearest case
of a permanent nuisance or trespass is one where the offending structure or condition is main-
tained as a necessary part of the operations of a public utility. Since such conditions are ordinarily
of indefinite duration and since the utility by making compensation is entitled to continue them,
it is appropriate that only one action should be allowed to recover for all the damages in-
flicted. It would be unfair to the utility to subject it to successive suits and unfair to the in-
jured party if he were not allowed to recover all of his probable damages at once." Id.
32. Baker, 39 Cal. 3d at 871, 705 P.2d at 871, 218 Cal. Rptr. at 298. Spaulding, 38 Cal.
2d at 270, 162 P.2d at 629. In Spaulding, the defendant, a private landowner, negligently main-
tained piles of dirt on his property, which caused mudslides on plaintiff's property. The trial
court ordered the nuisance abated but also awarded prospective damages for permanent diminution
in the value of plaintiff's property. See infra note 52.
33. 27 Cal. 2d 104, 162 P.2d 625 (1945).
34. Id. at 107-08, 162 P.2d at 626-27.
35. Baker, 39 Cal. 3d at 871, 705 P.2d at 871, 218 Cal. Rptr. at 298.
36. Id. at 872, 218 Cal. Rptr. at 299, 705 P.2d at 872.
37. Federal plenary power over aviation preempts local control over aircraft flights, but
does not preempt efforts by airport proprietors to reduce airport noise. Greater Westchester
Homeowners Assn. v. City of Los Angeles, 26 Cal. 3d 86, 94, 603 P.2d 1329, 1336, 160 Cal.
Rptr. 733, 739 (1979). See also Loma Portal Civic Club v. American Airlines, Inc., 61 Cal.
2d 582, 591, 394 P.2d 548, 544-45, 39 Cal. Rptr. 708, 714-15 (1964); Burbank v. Lockheed
Air Terminal, 411 U.S. 624, 635-40 (1973).
38. Baker, 39 Cal. 3d at 872-73, 705 P.2d at 872-73, 218 Cal. Rptr. at 299-300.
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with commercial flight schedules. 9 Furthermore, state regulations
specify that an airport proprietor has a duty to abate airport noise."
Thus, the majority concluded that while federal law adds a "level
of permanency" to the problem, federal law does not require that
the nuisance be treated as permanent."'
The fourth factor relied on by the Baker court to dismiss the defen-
dant's claim of privilege was based on public policy. 2 The majority
reasoned that the purpose of nuisance law is to provide a means of
recovery for harm suffered., 3 Defining a nuisance as permanent or
continuous on the basis of the privileged nature of the activity alone
creates an artificial distinction between two groups of plaintiffs. Con-
sequently, applying the statute of limitations to a "privileged" conti-
nuing nuisance but not to a nonprivileged continuing nuisance requires
the victim to "choose his or her tortfeasor wisely" in violation of
the compensatory purpose of nuisance law.4 4 The majority also refused
to enlarge the category of permanent nuisances, stating that once a
nuisance is classified as permanent, little incentive exists for the tort-
feasor to take remedial actions to abate the nuisance."' This result
would be inconsistent with the philosophy of tort law, which
encourages innovation.46
The supreme court concluded that airport operations are the
"quintessential continuing nuisance." ' 47 At the same time, the court
held that the plaintiffs could elect to treat airport noise as either a
continuous or permanent nuisance. 8
b. Dissenting Opinion
The dissenting opinion, written by Justice Mosk, 49 disagreed both
with the test articulated by the majority to determine whether a
39. See Bennet, supra note 1, at 450-64.
40. CAL. GOV'T CODE §6546.1. This section reads in part: "In operating the airport, the
separate public entity . . . shall not permit or authorize any activity in conjunction with the
airport which results in an increase in the size of the noise impact area . . . . In addition,
the entity shall diligently pursue all reasonable avenues available to insure that the adverse
effects of noise are being mitigated to the greatest extent reasonably possible." Id. See CAL.
ADMIN. CODE, tit. 21, R.5000-5080.5 (establishing airport noise standards).
41. Baker, 39 Cal. 3d at 873, 705 P.2d at 872-73, 218 Cal. Rptr. at 299-300.
42. Id. at 871-72, 705 P.2d at 871-72, 218 Cal. Rptr. at 299.
4-3. Id.
44. Id. The supreme court also noted that the "doctrine of election is designed to facilitate
just and equitable recovery." Id.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 873, 705 P.2d at 871-72, 218 Cal. Rptr. at 299-300.
48. Id.
49. Justice Lucas joined Justice Mosk in dissent to the nuisance holding. Id.
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nuisance is permanent or continuous and with the majority's inter-
pretation of Spaulding v. Cameron.51 While the majority stated that
the test for classifying a nuisance as permanent or continuous depended
upon the type of harm suffered, 5' the dissent stressed that the test
for determining whether a nuisance is permanent depends upon whether
the nuisance is "reasonably abateable. "52 Applying the reasonably
abateable test to the facts of Baker, the dissent concluded that air-
port noise is a permanent nuisance." The dissent relied on two fac-
tors in reaching this decision. First, injunctive relief was unavailable
since the defendant was a public entity." ' Second, the dissent argued
that defining the nuisance as continuing would subject the public en-
tity defendant to costly and vexatious litigation.5
The dissent also disagreed with the interpretation of the majority
concerning the application of the Spaulding election doctrine to the
facts in Baker. The dissent reasoned that the "privilege" alluded to
in Spaulding applies to nuisances that are "not reasonably abateable."
Since airport operations are not subject to injunctive relief, airport
noise is not reasonably abateable, and therefore the plaintiffs are not
free to treat the nuisance as continuing. 6 Justice Mosk further argued
that the ability of the airport to employ measures to mitigate noise
did not diminish the privilege because neither the state nor private
50. 38 Cal. 2d 265, 239 P.2d 625 (1952).
51. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
52. Baker, 39 Cal. 3d at 874, 705 P.2d at 873-74, 218 Cal. Rptr. at 300. The dissent
cited Spaulding v. Cameron as authority. In Spaulding, the defendant's leveling operations
created fills which washed onto plaintiff's land during rainstorms. The trial court found the
fills created a threat of repetitious inundations of mud onto plaintiffs property. The plaintiff
wished to recover past and future damages arguing the fill constituted a permanent nuisance.
The defendant contended that future damages were not permissible because the nuisance could
be abated. The lower court found permanent damage to plaintiff's property based on the con-
tinuing threat of future injury, but also found that the threat could be removed. On appeal,
the supreme court stated that in "the present case, it cannot be said as a matter of law that
the nuisance can or cannot be abated," and remanded the case to the trial court to determine
if "the nuisance is in fact permanent." Spaulding, 38 Cal. 2d 265, 270, 239 P.2d 625, 629.
See generally Sundell v. Town of New London, 409 A.2d 1315, 1320-21; Patz v. Farmegg
Products, Inc., 196 N.W.2d 557, 562; Maloney v. Heftier Realty Co., 316 So.2d 594, 595;
Rebel v. Big Tarkio Drainage Dist., 602 S.W.2d 787, 792-93 (jurisdictions which apply a
reasonably abateable test).
53. Baker, 39 Cal. 3d at 875, 705 P. 2d at 875, 218 Cal. Rptr. at 302.
54. Id. at 874, 705 P.2d at 874, 218 Cal. Rptr. at 301. See Greater Westchester Homeowners
Assn., 26 Cal. 3d at 94, 603 P.2d at 1332, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 736. The court states: "Commer-
cial flights which are conducted in strict compliance with federal regulations may not be en-
joined as nuisances, both because of the continuing public interest in air transportation, and
because of the likelihood of direct conflict with federal law." See also supra note 37.
55. Baker, 39 Cal. 3d at 876, 705 P.2d at 875, 218 Cal. Rptr. at 302. See Krueger v.
Mitchell, 332 N.W.2d 733, 741 (Wis. 1983) (successive actions against an airport would result
in vexatious litigation). See also supra note 31 (unfair to subject public utilities to successive suits).
56. Baker, 39 Cal. 3d at 875-76, 705 P.2d at 874-75, 218 Cal. Rptr. at 301-02.
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Both the California and United States Constitutions contain provi-
sions requiring compensation for the taking of private property for
public use. 8 A compensable taking occurs when a private party is
substantially deprived of the beneficial use of property by a public
entity for a public purpose. 9 Normally, an official taking of private
property occurs when a governmental body exercises its eminent
domain power in a condemnation proceeding. When a person is
deprived of property and a formal condemnation proceeding has not
been instituted, however, the injured party may bring a suit for in-
verse condemnation to compel payment of just compensation.6" The
principles guiding inverse condemnation and eminent domain actions
are interrelated and the judicial development of inverse condemna-
tion can be found in opinions dealing with eminent domain.6'
California case law indicates that authority for an inverse condem-
nation suit is found in the California Constitution. In Rose v. State,62
a suit for inverse condemnation was allowed against the state despite
the absence of legislative authority for the action.63 The Rose court
held that article 1, section 19 of the California Constitution, which
57. Id. See San Diego Unified Port Dist. v. Gianturco, 651 F.2d 1306, 1316-19, cert. denied
455 U.S. 1000 (1982) (state may not direct an airport proprietor to exercise noise abatement
power). See generally Bennet, supra note 1, 464-69; Werlich & Krinsky, The Aviation Noise
Abatement Controversy: Magnificent Laws, Noisy Machines, and the Legal Liability Shuffle,
15 LoYoLA L.A.L. REV. 69, 83-91 (1981); Comment, The 1980 Airport Noise Act: Noise Abate-
ment or Just More Noise?, 14 U.C.D. L. Rav. 1049 (1981).
58. See supra note 16.
59. Fountain v. Metro Atlanta Rapid Transit Authority, 678 F.2d 1038, 1043 (1982).
60. Sutfin v. State of California, 261 Cal. App. 2d 50, 54-55, 67 Cal. Rptr. 665, 668 (1968).
61. See Rose v. State of California, 19 Cal. 2d 713, 719-23, 123 P.2d 505, 510-12 (1942);
see also Van Alstyne, Statutory Modification of Inverse Condemnation, 19 STAN. L. REv. 727
(1967). Federal and state courts are split over whether eminent domain power is required before
liability in inverse condemnation attaches. The following authorities have held that statutory
eminent domain power is required: Jacobsen v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 566 F.2d
1353, 1358, rev'd. on other grounds, Western Int'l Hotels v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency,
387 F. Supp. 429, 439 (1975); Gregory v. City of New York, 346 F. Supp. 140, 143 (1972);
Ex parte Carter, 395 So.2d 65, 67 (1980); Collopy v. Wildlife Commission, 625 P.2d 994, 1005
(Colo. 1981); 3 NIcHos oN EMINENT DoMAN §8.1 (4), p. 8-39 (3d ed. 1981). Authorities sup-
porting the opposite view include the following: Fountain, 678 F.2d at 1045 (1982); Lenoir
v. Porters Creek Watershed Dist., 586 F.2d 1081, 1085-96 (1978).
62. 19 Cal. 2d 713, 123 P.2d 505.
63. Id. at 725, 123 P.2d at 513.
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protects individuals from an uncompensated taking of property, is
self-executing. The failure of the legislature to act could not take away
the right granted in the Constitution."1 Similarly, in Holtz v. San Fran-
sisco Bay Area Rapid Transit Dist.," the California Supreme Court
explicitly stated that the authority for prosecution of an inverse con-
demnation action derives from article I, section 19 of the California
Constitution. 66
In Sutfin v. State of California,6 7 the plaintiff alleged that the con-
struction of a highway by the state caused flooding which damaged
the plaintiff's automobiles."8 The state contended that the legislature
authorized the state to condemn only real, not personal property, and
therefore the damaged automobiles were not taken for public use.69
The court rejected the defense of the state, reasoning that liability
in inverse condemnation is based on the state constitution rather than
on statute." The court further stated that in many inverse condem-
nation suits the government does not intentionally exercise condem-
nation powers, and therefore a taking for public use does not depend
upon whether the defendant is authorized by statute to exercise affir-
mative eminent domain powers.7'
B. Nuisance
Nuisance is statutorily defined as the nontrespassory invasion of
another person's interest in the private use and enjoyment of land."
Early cases presumed that a nuisance would be abated, and therefore
plaintiffs were not allowed to recover for future damages." The remedy
for these "continuous" nuisances was either a suit for injunctive relief
or successive actions for damages as new injuries occurred. The con-
cept of "permanent" nuisance arose as a solution for determining
damages in cases in which an injunction was inappropriate or suc-
cessive actions would be undesirable to either the plaintiff or the defen-
64. Id.
65. 17 Cal. 3d 648, 552 P.2d 430, 131 Cal. Rptr. 646 (1976).
66. Id. at 652, 552 P.2d at 433, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 649.
67. 261 Cal. App. 2d 50, 67 Cal. Rptr. 665 (1968).
68. Id. at 52, 67 Cal. Rptr. at 666.
69. Id. at 55, 67 Cal. Rptr. at 666-67.
70. Id.
71. Id. See also Fountain, 678 F.2d at 1044. The court in Fountain stated that allowing
the lack of eminent domain power to be a defense would undermine the force of the just
compensation clause, because states could take property without paying compensation simply
by denying public entities eminent domain powers.
72. CAL. CIV. CODE §3479.
73. Spaulding, 38 Cal. 2d at 267, 239 P.2d at 625.
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dant."1 The classification of a nuisance as permanent allowed a plaintiff
to recover all past and anticipated future damages in one action."
Generally, courts classify a nuisance as permanent if injuries are
unalterable in character 6 or if the nuisance will presumably continue
indefinitely." On the other hand, most courts classify a nuisance as
continuous if the nuisance may be discontinued at any time.78 Thus,
both the type of harm suffered and the ability to reasonably abate
the nuisance are factors in categorizing nuisances.
As the doctrine of permanent nuisance developed, a new problem
arose. The simple distinctions drawn by the classifications of nuisances
as permanent or continuous proved inadequate to some authorities
when the offending activity was "legally privileged" to continue. 9
Legally privileged activity was interpreted to mean operations con-
doned by statute or carried on following an exercise of eminent domain
power.8 0 The suggested solution to the problem created by a legally
privileged activity was to subject the nuisance to one suit for all past
and future damages, which in effect mandated classification as a per-
manent nuisance."1
A more difficult problem arose on the issue of whether "equitably
privileged" conduct should result in treatment as a permanent
nuisance." Equitably privileged activity encompasses activity in which
an injunction would be improper even though the conduct is not con-
doned by statute or done through an exercise of eminent domain
power.83 The court in Spaulding implicitly recognized the problem
created by equitably privileged activity. The court first stated that
a public utility is a clear permanent nuisance because the utility has
a right to continue operations after compensating the landowner. The
Spaulding court then stated that the problem becomes more difficult
when the defendant is not privileged to continue the nuisance but
abatement of the nuisance is impractical.8" The Spaulding court did
74. Id. at 267-69, 239 P.2d at 225-26.
75. Id.
76. Williams, 150 Cal. at 626, 89 P. at 599.
77. Phillips, 27 Cal. 2d at 107, 162 P.2d at 625.
78. Spaulding, 38 Cal. 2d 265, 239 P.2d 625 (1952).
79. See McCormick, Damages for Anticipated Injury to Land, 37 HARv. L. REv. 574,
585-87 (1924); Spaulding, 38 Cal.2d at 267, 239 P.2d at 625.
80. See McCormick, supra note 79, at 585-89.
81. Id. See also Spaulding, 38 Cal. 2d at 267, 239 P.2d at 625.
82. See McCormick, supra note 79 at 587-89.
83. Id.
84. Spaulding, 38 Cal. 2d at 267-68, 239 P.2d at 627-28. The court said:
The clearest case of a permanent nuisance or trespass is the one where the offending
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recognize, however, that an attempt to categorically classify this type
of nuisance as permanent may lead to serious injustice due to dif-
ficulties in determining future damages, 5 the risk of res judicata,"s
and statute of limitation problems.87 As a result, the court in Spaulding
held that in doubtful cases the plaintiff may elect to treat the nuisance
as either permanent or continuous.8
Various California courts have wrestled with the question of whether
election should be allowed in all cases. One view favors a policy of
allowing plaintiffs to recover for injury regardless of whether the
activity is legally or equitably privileged.8 9 A second view indicates
that an election should be denied when the activity is legally or
equitably privileged, thereby protecting defendants from repeated
lawsuits.90 In Kafka v. Bozio,9" the defendant's building encroached
on the plaintiff's land. The supreme court indicated that the plaintiff
had an election to treat a nuisance as permanent or continuous even
if the nuisance was permanent in character and intended by the defen-
dant to be of indefinite duration.9 2 But in Williams v. Southern Pacific
R.R. Co., 93 the supreme court did not allow the plaintiff to characterize
railroad tracks as a continuous nuisance in order to avoid the statute
of limitations.94 Although no California case has specifically dealt with
structure or condition is maintained as a necessary part of the operations of a public
utility. Since such conditions are ordinarily of indefinite duration and since the utility
by making compensation is entitled to continue them, it is appropriate that only one
action should be allowed to recover for all the damages inflicted. It would be unfair
to the utility to subject it to successive suits and unfair to the injured party if he
were not allowed to recover all of his probable damages at once. A more difficult
problem is presented, however, if the defendant is not privileged to continue the
nuisance or trespass but its abatement is impractical or the plaintiff is willing that




86. Id. at 268, 239 P.2d at 628. The court stated: "... if the plaintiff assumes [the
nuisance] is not permanent and sues only for past damages, he may be met with the plea
of res judicata in a later action for additional injury if the court then decides the nuisance
was permanent in character from its inception." Id.
87. See supra note 27.
88. Spaulding, 38 Cal. 2d at 268, 239 P.2d at 268.
89. See infra notes 105-06 and accompanying text.
90. See McCormick, supra note 79, at 585-601. At least one commentator has suggested
that all legally and equitably privileged nuisances be deemed permanent, but also the lapse
of time, other than prescriptive rights, should never bar the plaintiff's cause of action for
the nuisance. Id. See also supra note 55.
91. 191 Cal. 746, 218 P. 753 (1923).
92. Id. at 752, 218 P. at 755-56.
93. 150 Cal. 624, 89 P. 599 (1907). The Kafka court indicated that the election doctrine
should be applied liberally. In Kafka, however, the offending structure was permanent in nature
as a result of the defendant's wrongful conduct. Id.
94. Id. at 627-28, 89 P.2d at 600.
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whether airport operations not subject to judicial abatement should
be classified as either permanent or continuous, two cases have in-
directly addressed the issue. In Nestle v. City of Santa Monica,9" the
supreme court in dictum stated that the plaintiff may be able to show
airport noise was a continuous nuisance.9 6 Additionally, in City and
County of San Fransisco v. Small Claims Court,97 the appellate court
stated that plaintiffs may elect to file successive actions for nuisance
in small claims courts against an airport. 98
III. LEGAL RAMICATIONS
A. Inverse Condemnation
Because inverse condemnation and eminent domain are closely
related doctrines, many courts hold that lack of eminent domain power
is a valid defense to an inverse condemnation suit. 99 Other authorities
argue that allowing the lack of eminent domain power to be a defense
to inverse condemnation undermines the force of the just compensa-
tion clause by permitting government to escape liability simply by
denying public agencies eminent domain powers. 00 Baker reaffirms
a view implicit in prior California cases by holding that the lack of
eminent domain power is not a defense to an inverse condemnation
claim. 10 Furthermore, the supreme court for the first time specified
that the source of an inverse condemnation action is the California
Constitution.'02 By clarifying the constitutional basis of an inverse
condemnation claim, Baker opens the door to broad application of
the inverse condemnation theory to other public entities besides air-
ports that lack eminent domain power.
B. Nuisance
The Baker majority specifically states that the sole test for
distinguishing between permanent and continuous nuisances depends
upon the type of harm suffered. This is contrary to cases which in-
dicated that the ability to abate the nuisance was also a major factor
95. 6 Cal. 3d 920, 496 P.2d 480, 101 Cal. Rptr. 568 (1972).
96. Id. at 937, 496 P.2d at 492, 101 Cal. Rptr. at 580.
97. 141 Cal. App. 3d 470, 190 Cal. Rptr. 340 (1983).
98. Id. at 478, 190 Cal. Rptr. at 345.
99. See supra note 61.
100. See Fountain, 678 F.2d at 1044.
101. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
102. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
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in classifying a nuisance as permanent.103 Thus, the category of per-
manent nuisances seems to be limited to those nuisances which can-
not physically, rather than judicially, be abated.
Baker further holds that plaintiffs may elect to treat airport opera-
tions as either continuous or permanent nuisances, thereby allowing
plaintiffs to elect whether to bring successive lawsuits against airport
proprietors. In so holding, the court indicates that plaintiffs may utilize
the election doctrine to avoid statute of limitation problems, or other
inequities, even if the defendant is authorized to continue the nuisance.
As a result, the category of permanent nuisances is further restricted.' 4
Because of difficulties in placing activities not subject to judicial
abatement within the traditional classifications of permanent or con-
tinuous nuisances, courts often decide the issue by balancing com-
peting policies underlying traditional nuisance priciples and the doc-
trine of election.' 5 The holding of the California Supreme Court in
Baker reflects a policy decision to allow plaintiffs an opportunity to
recover for injuries. °6 The Baker holding may subject the public entity
defendant, who cannot be judicially restricted from operating, to multi-
ple litigation and increased costs of doing business. The time and
monetary costs involved in filing successive actions may, however,
discourage plaintiffs from pursuing successive actions.
CONCLUSION
In Baker v. Burbank-Glendale-Pasadena Airport Authority, the
California Supreme Court encountered two legal theories commonly
used to remedy damage caused by airport noise: inverse condemna-
tion and nuisance. The court held that eminent domain powers are
not a prerequisite to liability for inverse condemnation. The court
further held that a plaintiff may elect to treat airport operations as
either a continuous or permanent nuisance, thereby allowing plain-
tiffs to bring successive lawsuits against airport proprietors. In so
103. See supra notes 74-98 and accompanying text.
104. See supra note 23.
105. See supra notes 91-98 and accompanying text.
106. See supra notes 84-89 and accompanying text. But see Kreuger, 332 N.W.2d 733 (Wis.
1983). The court in Krueger made a different policy determination. The Krueger court opted
to protect the defendant airport from repeated and vexatious lawsuits. The court indicated
that successive actions would disrupt air commerce, an area controlled extensively by federal
law. The Baker court, however, held that because nuisance liability is vested in the proprietor,
federal aviation planning would not be disrupted. The court also pointed out that successive
suits cannot be used to close airports or force changes in flight patterns and schedules. Baker,
39 Cal. 3d at 872-73, 705 P.2d at 872-73, 218 Cal. Rptr. at 299-300.
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holding, the court stipulated that the test for classifying a nuisance
as permanent or continuous depended upon the type of harm suf-
fered, without regard to the interest of the defendant in continuing
the activity.
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